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Abstract
We investigate the bearings of network externalities on product quality im-
provements requiring costly R&D investments. The model considers the
dynamic behaviour of a monopolist alternatively maximising profits or social
welfare. On the one hand, we confirm much of the acquired wisdom from the
static literature on the same topic, about the arising of quality undersupply
at the private optimum. On the other, we identify the initial conditions that
must be met for R&D activity to be observed under profit-seeking behaviour.
We also show that the presence of network externalities affects the optimal
behaviour of the profit-seeking firm but not that of a benevolent planner,
who serves all consumers and smooths the R&D costs leading to a steady
state quality which is independent of network concerns.
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1 Introduction
The analysis of dynamic monopoly is a long standing issue, dating back to
Evans (1924) and Tintner (1937), who investigated the pricing behaviour of
a firm with convex costs. The analysis of intertemporal capital accumulation
appeared later on (Eisner and Strotz, 1963). However, several other aspects
of monopoly behaviour have never been looked upon with the tools of optimal
control theory. One such aspect is the provision of product quality, which
has been debated in static models to highlight the monopolist’s incentive to
undersupply quality as compared to the social optimum (Spence, 1975; Mussa
and Rosen, 1978; Itoh, 1983; Gabszewicz et al. 1986; Besanko, Donnenfeld
and White, 1987; Champsaur and Rochet, 1989).
We develop a monopoly model where the firm may invest to increase
quality over time, and consumers enjoy both the utility attached to intrinsic
quality and a network effect, whereby the satisfaction of a generic consumer
is increasing in the number of individuals purchasing the same good or service
(see Cabral, Salant and Woroch, 1999; Shy, 2000).1 In a static model with
the same ingredients, it is shown that the monopolist trades off quality for
quantity as the network effect becomes more relevant (Lambertini and Orsini,
2001, 2003a). Here, the dynamic formulation of the problem permits to single
out some additional features of such a market. There exist a parameter region
where the monopolist does not find it convenient to improve product quality
because the overall willingness to pay of consumers is too low. This must
be contrasted with the behaviour of a benevolent social planner, who always
improves quality irrespective of how aﬄuent consumers are. As far as the
1Our model is close in spirit to a stream of literature where product quality interacts
with the formation of goodwill through advertising (see Feichtinger, Hartl and Sethi, 1994).
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extent of market coverage is concerned, we show that (i) the optimal (private)
monopoly output is always increasing in the amount of externalities; yet (ii)
the profit-seeking firm never covers the entire market, whatever the network
effect is, while the planner serves all consumers from the outset to the steady
state.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. The basic model is
in section 2. Section 3 contains the analysis of the profit-seeking monopoly
equilibrium, while the comparison with the social planner’s behaviour is in-
vestigated in section 4. Concluding remarks are in section 5.
2 The setup
Consider a monopoly market over an infinite (continuous) time horizon,
t ∈ [0,∞) . Consumers are indexed by their marginal willingness to pay
for quality, measured by parameter θ, uniformly distributed with density 1
over [0, θ].2 Accordingly, the size of the market is θ. The generic consumer
at θ ∈ [0, θ] buys one unit of the good iff:
U (t) = θq (t) + αy (t)− p(t) ≥ 0 (1)
where p (t) and q (t) are the price and the quality of the good supplied by
the monopolist at time t; αy (t) is the network externality which is assumed
to be linear in market demand y (t) . When inequality (1) is reversed, the
consumer located at θ does not buy and his utility is U = 0. Under partial
market coverage, there will be a marginal consumer at θ̂ (t) , who is indifferent
2Parameter θ can be thought of as the reciprocal of the marginal utility of income, so
that high-income consumers are indexed by high levels of θ, and conversely for low-income
consumers (see Tirole, 1988, ch. 2).
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between buying or not and identifies the lower bound of demand: y (t) ≡
θ − θ̂ (t) . By definition, the indifference condition writes:
θ̂ (t) q (t) + α
(
θ − θ̂ (t)
)
− p(t) = 0⇒ (2)
θ̂ (t) =
αθ − p (t)
α− q (t) .
Then, plugging θ̂ (t) into y (t)− θ+ θ̂ (t) = 0 and solving w.r.t. the price, we
obtain the inverse demand function:
p (t) = θq (t) + (α− q (t)) y (t) . (3)
Quality improvement involves an R&D investment process summarised
by the following differential equation:
·
q = bk (t)− δq (t) , b > 0 (4)
where k (t) is the instantaneous investment and δ ∈ [0, 1] is a constant
depreciation rate. The instantaneous cost involved by investing k (t) is
C (k (t)) = c [k (t)]2 . For simplicity, we normalise the marginal production
cost of output to zero. Hence, instantaneous monopoly profits are:
pi (t) ≡ p (t) y (t)− c [k (t)]2 (5)
and, given a constant discount rate ρ, the monopolist must choose y (t) and
k (t) so as to maximise:
Π ≡ ∫∞
0
{
p (t) y (t)− c [k (t)]2} e−ρtdt
s.t. :
·
q = bk (t)− δq (t) .
(6)
If instead the firm is run by a benevolent social planner, the scale of produc-
tion and the intensity of R&D efforts are chosen to maximise the discounted
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flow of social welfare, defined as the sum of profits and consumer surplus.
The latter, at any time t, corresponds to:
cs (t) ≡
∫ θ
θ̂
U (t) dθ. (7)
Therefore, the discounted stream of consumer surplus is:
CS ≡
∫ ∞
0
cs (t) e−ρtdt. (8)
Accordingly, the planner’s problem is
max
y(t),k(t)
SW ≡ Π+ CS (9)
under (4).
3 Monopoly optimum
The Hamiltonian of the firm is:
HM = e−ρt
{[
θq (t) + (α− q (t)) y (t)] y (t)
−c [k (t)]2 + λ (t) [bk (t)− δq (t)]} (10)
where λ(t) = µ(t)eρt, µ(t) being the co-state variable associated to quality.
The initial and transversality conditions are q (0) = q0 and
lim
t→∞
µ(t)q (t) = 0. (11)
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The FOCs are (henceforth we omit the indication of time and discounting):3
∂HM
∂k
= −2ck + bλ = 0 (12)
∂HM
∂y
= θq + 2y (α− q) = 0 (13)
−∂HM
∂q
=
·
λ− ρλ⇒
·
λ = λ (ρ+ δ)− y (θ − y) . (14)
FOC (12) yields:
λ =
2ck
b
;
·
k =
b
·
λ
2c
. (15)
From (13), we have y∗M = θq/ [2 (q − α)] > 0 for all q > α, which entails
∂y∗M/∂q ≤ 0 for all α ≥ 0.4 On this basis, we can claim:
Lemma 1 The monopolist trades off quantity and quality along the equilib-
rium path, provided any positive network effect operates.
The above Lemma illustrates what is by now a well known result in the
static models on the interplay between network effects and product quality,
according to which the presence of the externality, while inducing the monop-
olist to expand output, brings also about an otherwise undesirable reduction
of the quality level (see, e.g., Lambertini and Orsini (2001, 2003a). Here, we
extend this conclusion to a dynamic setting.
Now we are in a position to characterise the steady state equilibrium.
Using y∗M , we may write the dynamics of the R&D investment as follows:
·
k =
8c (ρ+ δ) (α− q)2 k − θ2bq (q − 2α)
8c (q − α) (16)
3Throughout the paper, we also omit the analysis of second order (concavity) condition,
which are always satisfied at saddle point equilibria.
4Throughout the paper, we use stars to indicate optimal controls and states along the
path to the steady state, and superscript ss to identify steady state levels.
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and imposing
·
k = 0, we get
k∗M =
θ
2
bq (q − 2α)
8c (ρ+ δ) (α− q)2 > 0∀ q > 2α. (17)
Note that the positivity of k∗M also involves a requirement on the initial
condition, i.e., q0 > 2α. Should this condition not be met, the monopolist
would not start R&D activities for quality improvement.
From (4),
·
q = 0 in q∗M = bk/δ. Plugging it into (17), we have three steady
state levels of the R&D effort: kssM1 = 0, which is economically meaningless,
and
kssM2,3 =
16αcδ (δ + ρ) + b2θ
2 ∓ bθ√Ψ
16bc (δ + ρ)
(18)
where
Ψ ≡ b2θ2 − 32αcδ (δ + ρ) ≥ 0 (19)
for all θ ≥√32αcδ (δ + ρ)/b. On the basis of (4) and (16), we can write the
Jacobian matrix:
JM ≡

∂
·
q
∂q
∂
·
q
∂k
∂
·
k
∂q
∂
·
k
∂k
 (20)
where:
∂
·
q
∂q
= −δ ; ∂
·
q
∂k
= b (21)
∂
·
k
∂q
= − α
2θ
2
b
4c (q − α)3 ;
∂
·
k
∂k
= ρ+ δ. (22)
Hence, the trace and determinant of the Jacobian matrix JM are:
T (JM) = ρ > 0 (23)
∆ (JM) =
α2θ
2
b2
4c (q − α)3 − δ (ρ+ δ) < 0.
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Using ∆ (JM) , one finds that (q
∗
M (k
ss
M3) , k
ss
M3) is a saddle point, while the
other solution is an unstable focus.5
The discussion carried so far establishes:
Proposition 2 Provided q0 > 2α and Ψ ≥ 0, the monopolist reaches a
unique saddle point equilibrium at
kssM =
16αcδ (δ + ρ) + b2θ
2
+ bθ
√
Ψ
16bc (δ + ρ)
qssM =
b
δ
kssM .
The associated price and output are:
yssM =
3bθ −√Ψ
4b
; pssM =
bθ
2δ
kssM . (24)
On the basis of (24), without further proof, we can state:
Corollary 3 The steady state output of the profit-seeking monopolist is smaller
than θ in the whole admissible range of parameters.
In other words, the monopolist always prices some consumers in the lower
part of the income distribution out of consumption.
Now we consider the issue of introductory price offers, which has been
largely discussed in the existing literature on network externalities.6 The
price dynamics obtains by differentiating the inverse demand function w.r.t.
time:
·
p =
·
q
[
2q
(
θ − y)− α (θ − 2y)]
2 (q − α) (25)
5The details are omitted for brevity.
6For an overview, see Shy (2000). For static and dynamic analyses of this aspect in
spatial monopoly models, see Rohlfs (1974) and Lambertini and Orsini (2003b), respec-
tively.
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which, using y∗M , rewrites as
·
p = θ
·
q/2 > 0 as long as
·
q > 0. This entails the
following corollary to Proposition 2:
Corollary 4 As long as the monopolist invests in R&D to increase quality,
he also monotonically increases the price over time. That is, the firm makes
an introductory price offer.
Note that the initial offer also involves a relatively low quality, both price
and quality being bound to increase over time up to the steady state. More-
over, we can investigate the bearings of network effects on the steady state
levels of controls, state and price:
∂kssM
∂α
< 0;
∂yssM
∂α
> 0;
∂qssM
∂α
< 0;
∂pssM
∂α
< 0. (26)
As the weight of the network externality increases, the steady state levels of
R&D effort and quality shrink, since expanding the output is more convenient
than increasing quality. To allow for a larger output, the price must be lower.
In balance, the effects of a change in α on equilibrium price, output and
quality entail that social welfare increases as the weight attached to network
effects becomes more relevant.
4 Social optimum
Suppose first the planner may only partially cover the market. If so, the
demand function is (3) and the Hamiltonian of the social planner is:
HSP = e−ρt
{[
θq + (α− q) y] y + qy2/2 (27)
−ck2 + β (bk − δq)} ,
8
where β = γeρt, β(t) being the co-state variable associated to quality. Initial
and transversality conditions are as in section 3. The FOCs of the planner
are:
∂HSP
∂k
= −2ck + bβ = 0 (28)
∂HSP
∂y
= θq + y (2α− q) = 0 (29)
−∂HSP
∂y
=
·
β − ρβ ⇒
·
β = β (ρ+ δ)− y (2θ − y) /2. (30)
From (28), one obtains:
·
k =
b
·
β
2c
; β =
2ck
b
. (31)
From (29), y∗SP = θq/ (2α− q) , with
y∗SP ∈
(
0, θ
) ∀ q ∈ (0, α) . (32)
Using (30-31) and y∗SP , one can impose
·
k = 0 to obtain:
k∗SP =
θ
2
bq (q − 4α)
4c (ρ+ δ) (2α− q)2 > 0 ∀ q > 4α. (33)
The condition for k∗SP > 0 contrasts with the requirement for y
∗
SP ∈
(
0, θ
)
.
That is, (i) if q ∈ (0, α) , then market demand is well defined but optimal
R&D investment is negative; (ii) if q ∈ (α, 4α) , then y∗SP > θ and k∗SP < 0;
finally, if q > 4α, then y∗SP > θ and k
∗
SP > 0. This amounts to saying that
partial market coverage is incompatible with social planning:
Lemma 5 For all α ≥ 0, the social planner serves all existing consumers
from the initial date to the steady state.
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At this point, we have to reformulate the optimum problem of the social
planner under the assumption that ySP = θ from the very outset. This entails
that instantaneous profits and consumer surplus write as follows:
pi (t) ≡ p (t) θ − c [k (t)]2 (34)
cs (t) ≡
∫ θ
0
[
θq (t)− p (t) + αθ] dθ (35)
=
θ
2
[
θ (q (t) + 2α)− 2p (t)]
so that instantaneous welfare corresponds to:
sw (t) =
θ
2
2
[q (t) + 2α]− c [k (t)]2 , (36)
which is independent of the price. Therefore, we may suppose that the
planner sets the lowest admissible price that allows to make up for R&D
costs, in order to keep profits non-negative.
Accordingly, the planner’s Hamiltonian function now becomes:7
HSP = e−ρt
{
θ
2
2
[q + 2α]− ck2 + β (bk − δq)
}
(37)
The maximum problem now involves only one control and one state variable.
The FOCs are:
∂HSP
∂k
= −2ck + bβ = 0 (38)
−∂HSP
∂y
=
·
β − ρβ ⇒ (39)
·
β = β (ρ+ δ)− θ
2
2
.
7Again, henceforth the indication of time is omitted for brevity.
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Equation (38) yields the same value of β as well as the same dynamics of k
as in (31). Then, using β = 2ck/b and (39), we obtain:
·
k = k (ρ+ δ)− bθ
2
4c
. (40)
Equation (40) shows that the planner’s instantaneous investment along the
equilibrium path is independent of quality. This stems from the fact that, all
consumers being served at all times, the planner finds it convenient to fully
smooth investment costs over time.
Solving the system
{
·
q = 0,
·
k = 0
}
, one finds the steady state levels of
quality and R&D effort:
qssSP =
b2θ
2
4cδ (ρ+ δ)
, kssSP =
bθ
2
4c (ρ+ δ)
. (41)
Using the Jacobian matrix of the dynamic system, which is defined as in
(20), we can calculate the trace and determinant:
T (JSP ) = ρ > 0 (42)
∆ (JSP ) = −δ (ρ+ δ) < 0
for all δ ∈ (0, 1] . Therefore, the steady state (41) is stable in the saddle point
sense. The foregoing discussion leads to
Proposition 6 The pair (qssSP , k
ss
SP ) is a saddle point, unaffected by network
externalities.
Given that the price level is not univocally defined, and quality improve-
ments hinges upon fixed costs only without interacting with the output level,
the equilibrium R&D effort and quality are exactly the same that the planner
would have chosen without network externalities.
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5 Conclusions
We have assessed the bearings of network effects on the incentive to improve
product quality through costly R&D efforts in a monopoly market where
consumers have different marginal willingness to pay for quality and the firm
may alternatively maximise profits or social welfare.
The analysis has been carried out in a dynamic model where the firm
chooses the extent of market coverage together with the quality-improving
investment.
Our results can be summarised in the following terms. While confirming
much of the existing wisdom from the static analysis of network externalities,
our model has singled out the initial conditions that must be satisfied for the
R&D activity to start under the monopoly regime. Contrary to the result
obtained in the static model (Lambertini and Orsini, 2003a), the monopolist
never finds it profitable to cover the entire market, no matter how high
the network externality can be. Provided that the profit-seeking firm does
invest, in doing so she takes into account both the current quality level and
the extent of the externality, while it would be socially optimal to smooth the
R&D costs perfectly, by investing a constant amount of resources at every
instant. Moreover, the planner always serves all consumers in the market,
with a loose pricing rule, whose only requirement is to allow for the firm to
cover R&D costs.
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